fuson wang Charlotte Smith's novel Desmond (1792) seems suspiciously easy to categorize. Most critics have decided that it represents Smith's most straightforward attempt at a politically radical novel, not as conventionally romantic as her earlier novels-Emmeline (1788), Ethelinde (1789), and Celestina (1791)-and not as politically cautious as her later work in "The Emigrants" (1793) and The Old Manor House (1793).1 Adriana Craciun and Kari Lokke call Desmond "Smith's most explicitly political novel"; Antje Blank and Janet Todd call it her "most overtly polemical text"; and Judith Davis Miller calls it Smith's most earnest attempt at "directly stated radical politics. "2 Such consensus correctly locates Smith within the revolutionary milieu of the 1790s, but it obscures her troubled engagement with radical politics. Those critics' commanding adverbs-"explicitly, " "overtly," "directly"-mark the titular character, Lionel Desmond, as a radical protagonist who successfully undermines aristocratic privilege, unjustly gendered practices, and corrupt governments. Though Desmond's extramarital relationship with the unhappily married Geraldine Verney certainly fills out the primary narrative, I argue that the Burkean counter-narrative of Erasmus Bethel-Desmond's old mentor and friend-challenges the liberating hero's ostensibly virtuous path towards a revolutionary end; the political tra jectory, then, must defy explicit, overt, or direct categorization. Unfortunately, most critics have either ignored Bethel or cast him as a mere punching bag that blithely absorbs the many practised blows against Burkean conservatism.3 Such readings smooth over the rough contours of Smith's novel and purchase some comfortable political exile in charlot te smith's desmond coherence at the cost of understanding the subtle negotiation between Desmond's narrative of revolutionary "objectivity" or "transcendence" and Bethel's paradoxically more subversive nar ra tive, a narrative that ends up taking Edmund Burke much more seriously than it does, for example, Thomas Paine or Mary Wollstone craft.4 If we accept Northrop Frye's definition of comedy as a genre that achieves the maximal social integration of outlying characters, then Desmond is certainly no comedy, for Bethel's obstinate resistance against integration into the plot serves as a persistent reminder that revolutions are seldom as unequivocally celebratory as Desmond and Geraldine make them seem.5
For these reasons, my argument about Desmond relies less upon an overworked political spectrum of radical and conservative and more upon the agile theoretical framework of cosmopolitanism, a term broadly defined by Immanuel Kant, refined by Smith, corrupted by her contemporaries, and meticulously tweaked by more recent interventions. In particular, I invoke contemporary discussions from both political-scientific (Bruce Robbins, Steven Vertovec, and Robin Cohen) and literary-critical (Adriana Craciun and Anne K. Mellor) perspectives to clarify the novel's cos mo pol itan sophistication. The true cosmopolite deftly medi ates geo graphical and ideological differences rather than merely assimilating, for example, the French Revolution into more palatable and nation alistic (British) brands of radicalism. In turning the focus of the novel away from the domestic Wollstonecraft-Burke pamphlet war and towards the thorny mediations of Anglo-French senti ment, I complicate the political legibility of Desmond while offering an unexpected cosmopolitan alternative in Bethel. In this way, I locate Smith in an increasingly fertile conversation about eighteenth-century and Romantic cosmopolitanism, hospital ity, and ethical obligation.6 Fixating on Smith's radical and conservative sym pathies merely reproduces loud domestic contro- versies-an imprecise (and unfair) account of literature un thinking ly recapitulating politics-while missing the truly trans nation al texture of Smith's politics and her complex literary importation of French ideas. The novel Desmond cannot be so quickly absorbed into the British Revolution con troversy because it stubbornly resists those polemic terms; Desmond models an ideological sophis tica tion (through the story of Bethel's con ver sion from Burkean conservatism to a more contingent political stance) that strives to make ethical sense of Kant's hotly contested notion of "cosmopolitan right. " The widely discussed political poles of the novel-radical and con servative-sufficiently delimit its revolutionary ambitions, yet they fall just short of explaining the final, idealized portrait of Desmond's Utopian circle. Mellor has suggested that the novel's concluding marriages lead to a new Anglo-French revolutionary consciousness through the mixed union of the French-Catholic Montfleuri and the English-Protestant Fanny.7 Yet she also retains a healthy suspicion about the viability of Desmond's new order because of his persistently unbalanced gender politics.8 Smith's political claim in the novel, according to this expanding line of analysis, is more than just the radical mantra of liberté, égalité, fraternité; it is an even stronger claim to a kind of cosmopolitan community. Kant imagines an inevitable yet hazy progress towards what he calls a "universal history" with a "cosmopolitan purpose" that produces an international community maintained by a series of enlightened checks and balances.9 Universality, though, proves to be a problematic criterion because of competing national and individual interests. Kant resorts to an innate drive to hospitality to define his eventual cosmopolitan state of perpetual peace: "The idea of cosmopolitan right is ... not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity"; most importantly, in this universal community "a exile in charlot te smith's desmond violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere. "10 This ambitious plan for a perfect and perpetual peace is a tall order for "unwritten" codes of hospitality. Stephen Vertovec and Robin Cohen offer a more schematic attempt to capture that sense of the universal: "Cosmopolitanism suggests something that simultaneously: (a) transcends the seemingly exhausted nation-state model; (b) is able to mediate actions and ideals oriented both to the universal and the particular, the global and the local; (c) is culturally anti-essentialist; and (d) is capable of repre senting variously complex repertoires of allegiance, identity and interest. In these ways, cosmopolitanism seems to offer a mode of managing cultural and political multiplicities. "11 Mellor still finds some difficulty in this grand scheme of simultaneity and substitutes a more modest, local alternative: "Enduring international, interfaith and inter-racial marriages-these become the hallmarks of a truly cosmopolitan subjectivity, what I am calling an 'embodied cosmopolitanism. '"12 My argument situates Smith's novel in this increasingly prolific discussion, fleshes out that healthy suspicion of Desmond's radical aspira tions, and relocates Bethel as part of the novel's politics. Bethel certainly problematizes any singular, cosmopolitan conclusion; his counterbalancing presence confirms that a theory about "managing cultural and political multiplicities" must necessarily be multiple itself. It must accommodate the individual and collective as well as the radical and the conservative in a universal formulation of cosmopolitan right. In the end, neither the weak claim to radicalism nor the ending's stronger claim to Anglo-French cosmopolitanism holds up to careful scrutiny, primarily because of Bethel's destabilizing plot and his stubborn refusal to vanish completely from a youthful and idealistic novel that continually tries to write him out of its political framework. Radicalism and cosmopolitanism are unusually heady topics for readers expecting another romantic potboiler from a starving artist. Smith wrote profitable novels to support an abusive and profligate husband, to make legal sense of her father-in-law's byzantine will (the inspiration for Charles Dickens's case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce in Bleak House), and to provide for her growing family.13 Yet, strangely, Desmond frequently tends to instruct more than it delights; the novel modulates dizzyingly between political propaganda and sensibility, between a roman à clef about the Revolution and a sentimental epistolary novel. A.A. Markley emphasizes this common strategy in the English Jacobin novels of reform: they "express profound anxiety about the balance of sensibility and reason" and "illustrate the repercussions of failing to achieve such a balance. "14 Rather than locating that balance in a single reformist hero as Markley does in his readings of these novels of the 1790s, I argue that Bethel's residual presence must be integrated into the novel's complex balancing act. Even though the plot seems to work hard to exclude him from the seem ingly comic ending despite his conversion to the favoured side of the revolutionary debates about the rights of man, his narrative of ideological mutability offsets the bland predictability of the ending's Utopian celebration of family and marriage. In the last letter, for example, Desmond emphasizes this offsetting absence three times in as many pages: "Come, my dear Bethel, I beseech you come hither, and render by your presence, still more happy, those friends for whom you have been so generously interested"; "Bethel, my friend, come to me I beseech you, that I may have somebody to whom I can talk"; "lend me, dear Bethel, some of your calm reason" (412-14). The novel ends abruptly before Bethel can satisfy Desmond's thrice-insistent plea, leaving the old widower at the margins of the happy conclusion. Further, the "presence" that Desmond requests remains strikingly disembodied. Instead of love, Bethel provides merely a generous interest, and instead of Bethel's bodily presence, Desmond prefers epistolary distance and the mediated discourse of "talk" and "calm reason. " This ending suggests that even if Bethel did visit Desmond's increasingly insular "circle of friends, " he would still be the odd man out.
Throughout the novel, Desmond struggles diligently to find some way to include Bethel in his social life. His parameters for inclusion, however, push Bethel even further away from the scene of domestic felicity: exile in charlot te smith's desmond Geraldine will bear my name-will be the directress of my familywill be my friend-my mistress-my wife!-I set before me these scenes-I imagine these days of happiness to come-I see the beloved group assembled at Sedgewood:-my Geraldine-You, my dear Bethel-your sweet Louisa-my friend Montfleuri, and his Fanny.-I imagine the delight of living in that tender confidence of mutual affection, which only such a circle of friends can taste.-I go over in my imagination our studies, our amusements, our rural improve ments; a series of domestic and social happiness, for which only life is worth having. (414) Despite Desmond's imperious certainty of possession-"my name, " "my family, " "my friend, " "my mistress, " "my wife"-these scenes remain "days of happiness to come, " which cheerfully posits an unproblematic futurity of continued improvement of affection, estate, and society. Mellor rightly takes those possessive pronouns to task for their evocation of the laws of coverture and concludes that "Smith undercuts such a positive reading of the end of the novel by reminding us that it represents the political standpoint only of males. "15 Bethel offers an important additional check to Desmond's tidy ending. Without Bethel, Desmond's claim that "life is worth having" only if one participates in his brand of domestic bliss sounds like genial exaggeration. If, however, his spectral presence in the letter is given some corporeal weight, it becomes clear that an exclusion from marriage implies an annihilating exclusion from "life" itself, which turns Desmond's domestic sentiment into a frighteningly caustic boast. Surely this group that will assemble in Sedgewood in the following year will include Bethel, yet Smith equally emphasizes the asymmetry of this society: the married partners-Desmond and Geraldine, Montfleuri and Fanny-are awkwardly juxtaposed with Bethel and Louisa, a father-daughter pair that recalls the sad prehistory of Bethel and his former wife, also called Louisa. Desmond transi tions rhetorically from the singular possessive "my" to the pluralized property of "our" but still fails to capture Frye's sense of comic integration because his imagination will allow no asymmetry and quickly incorporates Bethel and Louisa into an ultimately incompatible domestic framework.
To understand this persistent exclusion of Bethel and his role in problematizing Desmond's rosy future, the novel must be taken fuson wang seriously-at least temporarily-as a roman à clef so that we can begin unlocking the doors that sometimes not so subtly hide historical counterparts. As Blank and Todd helpfully point out in an introduction to their edition of the novel, Erasmus Bethel shares initials with Edmund Burke, and Desmond sounds suspiciously like De Pont, the young Frenchman whose query about the French Revolution inspired Burke to draft his Reflections on the Revolution in France.16 On the one hand, Smith's ideological sympathies appear to be the low-hanging fruit of the novel, ready to be plucked, culled, and categorized in the dissenting tradition. Blank and Todd even go so far as to insist that Smith "relentlessly exhibited Burke as a corrupt opportunist who coolly prostituted his rhetorical gift" and that Desmond "has to be read as a pointed refutation of Burke's ideology. "17 On the other hand, if one must read the novel as an unflinching challenge to Burke's conservatism, much of its political nuance is lost. This is not to say that Smith is some sort of Burke apologist or that the Revolution controversy is an irrelevant context; rather, Smith shrewdly realizes that complaint and "pointed refutation" are not enough, that the myriad impassioned responses from political theorists such as Paine and Wollstonecraft are in many ways socially and even politically inert. To show this, Smith carefully tempers her radical politics with sentimental romance, her Paineite polemic with mediated epistolarity, and her Wollstonecraftian rationality with sensibility; such calculated hybridity makes it difficult to insist that Desmond "has to be read" in one way or another. If a roman à clef is a novel with a key, then Smith delights in perversely changing the locks, preferring volatility and mutability to any kind of crystallization of revolutionary ideology. In the end, the extent to which Desmond reads as a critique of Burkean conservatism depends primarily on our understanding of the supposed Burke character, a task that becomes increasingly difficult as that stand-in, Bethel, continually refuses to take on his ostensible role as political villain. 16 The name "Desmond" is also des mondes in French. Smith explicitly dubs her protagonist a cosmopolite, or a citizen of the world. Yet she might also be undercutting these cosmopolitan credentials with a subtle reference to the philosophy of le meilleur des mondes possibles, satirized in Voltaire's Candide (1759). Despite Desmond's success as a radical hero, Smith constantly builds in checks to intransigent and overly idealized philosophies such as Pangloss's métaphysico-théologo-cosmolonigologie. 17 Blank and Todd, 21-23. exile in charlot te smith's desmond Desmond writes about Burke's Reflections, "I foresee that a thousand pens will leap from their standishes (to parody a sublime sentence of his own) to answer such a book" (183). The parodied passage is now a favourite instance of Burke's chauvinism: "I thought ten thousand swords must have leaped from their scabbards to avenge even a look that threatened her with insult. But the age of chivalry is gone" (76). Desmond's prediction, of course, comes true. Paine and Wollstonecraft explicitly target Burke's book and provide point-by-point refutations. Desmond himself participates in this critique when he cleverly-or perhaps just fashion ably-parodies Burke's "sublime sentence." Bethel moves more tentatively; when he encounters Paine's pamphlet, he cautious ly praises the "boldness and singularity" of an "obscure individual" (193) and finds himself incapable of formulating a response, delegating that task for Desmond to take up in a future letter. When this anticipated letter arrives, Desmond glances at Paine's The Rights of Man superficially and finds another easy confirmation of his own beliefs; he musters up all his powers of mechanical paraphrase and uncritically recapitulates Paine's argument. Although Smith advocates a type of radical politics, she also embeds a subtler critique of ad hominem approaches and the self-reflexive formation of opinions that can only see truth in arguments that square with already ingrained beliefs. Smith fears that this type of discourse could lead to a dangerous new conservatism, a fear that presciently anticipates France's troubled post-Revolutionary period of Robespierre's Reign of Terror and Napoleon's despotic empire. Smith refuses to pick up yet another one of those thousand pens to attack Burke with well-rehearsed slogans; instead, she axiomatizes the complaint and prefers not to participate in the ad hominem spectacle, allowing her to develop a refreshingly positive ethic of revolution, one that does not hinge solely upon the follies of a straw-man.
Bethel's exclusion from the Sedgewood circle, from the inflexible vocabulary of the roman à clef, and from conventionally revo lu tionary politics affords him the opportunity to articulate a surprisingly cosmopolitan ideal apart from the comic ending's illusory sense of ideological closure. Bethel's unique brand of cos mo politanism does not arise from some vague geographical wanderlust (his age surely prevents such extensive travel) but rather from his narrative exclusion and the persistence of the contingent logic of his disruptive plot. Bruce Robbins offers a useful refinement of the concept of cosmopolitanism that begins to explain the scope of Bethel's accomplishment: "The most generous and useful way to begin rethinking cosmopolitanism ... is neither as an ideal unplaceableness nor as sordid elitism, but as a way of relativizing and problematizing the scale and the units of democracy. "18 Robbins's strategic fine-tuning proves especially useful in reading Desmond because it offers both a negative (what cosmopolitanism should not be) and a positive (how we can reshape the concept to more judicious ends) rubric for a contemporary evaluation of cosmopolitan politics. Even though it has been taken as the novel's ideological centre, the Sedgewood circle exemplifies many of the properties of Robbins's ungenerous version of cosmo politanism in its unexamined international composi tion ("ideal unplaceableness") and its exclusionary prac tices ("sordid elitism"). Smith fully anticipates the backlash against the pitfalls of cosmopolitanism and assigns Bethel, as excluded outsider, the daunting task of "relativizing and problematizing" the novel's radical politics.
Such a significant reshuffling of character function first requires some proper motivation. After all, Smith's chosen title is not Bethel, and critics have mostly remained content to endorse the Utopian conclusion as the ideological crux. Craciun, for example, claims that "unlike the cosmopolitan refuges that serve as the conclusions for earlier novels like Desmond (1792) and The Banished Man [1794] , irresolvable cultural conflict often figures as the setting for Smith's later fiction. "19 Yet Desmond is certainly not without its own "irresolvable cultural conflict"; specifically, Bethel's "rela tivizing and problematizing" function transforms those "cosmo politan refuges" into a productive site of "cultural conflict. " His contingent politics of conversion distinguishes him sharply from the unwavering radicalism of the novel's young protagonists. In making this ideological distinction, my goal is Since the phrase "conversion narrative" already has several literary-critical commitments, some preliminary clarification is in order. Like Robbins in his rethinking of cosmopolitanisms, I dis tinguish Bethel's conversion narrative from some cruder forms. Bruce Hindmarsh provides a useful description of the more conventional trajectory of conversion: "What these evangelical narratives point to as the great desideratum of human life is the recovery of right relationship with God. "21 Recovery suggests a condition that is always already right; one only needs to follow Providence's pre ordained path towards virtue. In Village Politics (1793), for example, Hannah More imports the evangelical model for counterrevo lutionary purposes when her mason abruptly discovers his mistaken adherence to radical ideologies thanks to his friend the blacksmith and recovers his "right relationship" with society.22 This morality play stages dialogue without productive conversation and ends up closer to a one-sided Socratic lecture from The Symposium than a genuine exchange.23 Like Alcibiades to Socrates, the mason can only nod his head in agreement and bow to the blacksmith's authoritative and superior logic. Bethel's conversion stands apart from over-rehearsed and transparently didactic conversion nar ratives; in Desmond, the "right relationship" always remains volatile, which makes room for political agency instead of some sort of divine "recovery. " I also wish to distinguish my use of the term "conversion" from discussions of the Jacobin novels of the 1790s. In these, what is at stake is "the conversion of the individual reader-that is, in fostering a revolution of opinions one reader at a time"; conversion represents a process that occurs in the individual minds of the reading audience rather than in a crucial ideological turn within the plot itself.24 That individual reader is undoubtedly part of Smith's calculation as well, but Desmond is unique in its complex simulation of conversion through a fictionalized Burke. In short, Smith sets her sights not only on winning over popular opinion, but also on imagining the conversion of the Revolution controversy's greatest conservative voice. Despite the ambitiousness of that goal, the actual concession remains understated. In a reversal of the Platonic relationship between older teacher and eager ephebe, Bethel concedes to his former ward quite early in the novel: "In answer to your remarks and narratives, I observe, that it is an incontrovertible truth, allowed even by those who have written professedly against it, that a revolution in the government of France was absolutely necessary: and, that it has been accomplished at less expence of blood, than any other event, I will not say of equal magnitude (for I know of none such in the annals of mankind) but of such a nature, ever cost before, is also a position that the hardest prejudice must, in despite of misrepresentations, allow" (178). Unlike the mason's easy concession, Bethel's correspondence with Desmond continues to check youthful enthusiasm with measured response, and his lectures persist until the end despite this early conversion to the cause of liberty. In contrast, Sampson Staniforth, an English soldier who converted to Methodism after the War of Austrian Succession, says of his life: "Everything that preceded [my] conversion was prologue; everything that followed was epilogue. "25 For him, that exile in charlot te smith's desmond moment of conversion completely fills out the primary narrative and relegates everything else to the margins of his spiritual autobiography. Smith affords Bethel nothing but margins, so his conversion remains agile and uncertain, never settling on that fixed, "right relationship. " Smith prefers to relocate the discussion to a flexible, epistolary forum that makes room for these contingent concessions and shaky conversions. She hopes to prevent radical discourse from falling into a socially retrograde arena in which the debate centres on the preservation of illusory authority and individual egos rather than on the promulgation of social reform. Unlike Burke, Bethel succeeds in working around "the hardest prejudice" and arrives at a more nuanced position through his unique conversion, a remarkable feat unequalled by anyone else in the novel, including the consistently "revolutionary" characters.
Verney's death-bed repentance and Montfleuri's transformation from mild libertine to virtuous husband might also be read as conversions, but Smith uses these relatively late examples as red herrings that put Bethel's earlier conversion into stark relief. Verney has no residual presence after his death; both his body and his repentance evaporate from the novel as soon as he utters his last words. As he did (indirectly) with Bethel and Louisa, Desmond narrates Verney's death in the language of exclusion: "May his faults be forgotten by the world, as his divine Geraldine has forgiven them" (406). Desmond does not offer even a clumsy effort of inclusion as he does with Bethel. He firmly concludes that Verney's villainy can be forgiven, but it must also be forgotten. In contrast to Bethel's measured conversion from Burkean conserva tism to a qualified revolutionary ideology, Verney bases his repen tance on two factors, both far from redemptive: his lack of money and his imminent death. He says, "Perfectly secure of her honour, more so than I deserved to be, not naturally of a jealous temper, and engaged in the pleasures of the world, as long as I had money to enjoy them, I never heeded [Desmond's affection for Geraldine]" (407). Verney's seeming magnanimity and virtuous conversion depend more on his fatal condition than any substantive reconsideration of his life of dissipation. If he were not dying and penniless, he would still be gallivanting around Europe, spending money, and gleefully soliciting extramarital sex. Further, in his final words, Verney continues to imagine Geraldine as property that he can bequeath to Desmond, which is the final and sturdiest nail in Verney's coffin; Smith could hardly be endorsing fuson wang Verney's misogynistic invocation of the laws of coverture.26 Unlike the uncomfortable-almost homicidal-implication that Bethel's life fails to be "worth having, " Desmond's morbid impulse with respect to Verney-"Verney is gone!" (406)-is an exclamation we can safely endorse.
Montfleuri begins his own conversion narrative with an awkward imitation of English epistolarity and an overly familiar address to Bethel, a man with whom Montfleuri has only the slightest acquaintance. He writes on behalf of Desmond to satisfy a strangely academic exercise in Anglicizing Frenchness: "I write to you by the express wish of our dear friend, Desmond, who begs me and ma douce, Fanni, to tell you what he thinks we can say better than he can himself " (409). The French residues in his voice highlight his imitative infidelity and the gauche artificiality of his letter, which languishes lazily at the level of pantomime. And yet Desmond judges the letter good enough for the author's unproblematic admittance into the idyllic Sedgewood circle, and Montfleuri's Frenchness vanishes easily into Desmond's social calculus. Even though Montfleuri's marriage is both international and interfaith, it cannot fully sustain its cosmopolitan ambition since part of that "union" requires the problematic erasure of French and Catholic differences. Like Bethel, Montfleuri must endure the unrelenting ideological contraction of Desmond's circle, or, to appropriate Robbins's useful phrase, the "sordid elitism" of the cosmopolitan ending. Montfleuri emerges from it relatively unscathed, however, with Desmond easily factoring him into his social equation because Montfleuri himself seems willing to reproduce (if imperfectly) Desmond's virtuous Englishness. Whereas Verney's "conversion" proves vacuous because of its dependence on the deus ex machina of convenient plot lines, Montfleuri's "conversion" is emptied out by its reliance on a purely imitative rhetoric and its unthinking conformity. Bethel's final words have neither the physical finality of Verney's death nor the crystallized virtue of Montfleuri's transformation: "Let me hear as soon as you [Fanny] have received and considered it; and, if I can be of any use, I will instantly set out for Bath-though I know not what good I can do; or, indeed, what can be done at all" (368). In what is surely one of the shortest letters in the novel, Bethel uncere-exile in charlot te smith's desmond moniously forgoes the bow and slyly slinks off the stage. A novel without Bethel leaves only two alternatives to Desmond's plan, both bleak: ignoble death (Verney) or unflinching assimilation (Montfleuri). Bethel offers some much-needed breathing room, providing a third way that does not strictly depend on a single moment of conclusive conversion; he represents instead a type of ideological agility that requires dialogue and reflection before wholeheartedly endorsing the politically radical script of either the French Revolution or Desmond's Utopian plans.
Yet Smith does not merely endorse the Burkean counternarrative over the radical marriage plot. Since neither Bethel nor Desmond alone does justice to the novel's complex political and literary texture, Smith shrewdly constructs a dual cosmopolitanism, a strategy that depends on the precarious balance between the two inter twining narratives. Smith's peculiarly plural ized vari a tion on cosmopolitanism makes it impossible to take the Sedgewood circle's mixed marriage as its centre. The ending leaves significant remainders-most notably Bethel-and opens some space for new ideological formations at the periphery. Mellor formulates a usefully refined definition of cosmopolitanism that can only be applied to "those authors, works or political systems that simul taneously endorse both a theoretical and an embodied form of international, interfaith, and inter-racial union."27 At the end of the two intersecting plots, theory and embodiment arrive simultaneously: Bethel provides theoretical sophistication and ideological equanimity, and the marital plot articulates an embodied version of Bethel's embrace of ideological otherness. In both cases, Smith loosens the narrative rigidity of the political theorist and realizes that mere "pointed refutation" and stubborn, ideological intransigence lead to such negative formulations of cos mopolitanism (restrictive rules rather than a positive rights dis course) as Kant's concept of "cosmopolitan purpose" and "perpetual peace. "28 Smith instead articulates her idealized cosmo politanism as a careful balancing act between Bethel's "rela tiviz ing and problematizing" function and Desmond's "em bodied cosmopolitanism, " which might "at last be able to give sub stance to Kant's concept of cosmopolitan right. "29 That elusive "substance" lies in Smith's deft handling of ideological doubling and a positive cosmopolitan rights discourse that manages to accommodate both self and other, identity and difference. Here, Smith takes Kant's challenge very seriously. Since "a violation of right in one part of the world is felt everywhere, " a revolution in which the radical winners stand triumphant over a defeated ancien régime cannot capture Smith's Kantian politics of accommodation. Despite his status as a minor character, Bethel's present absence is "felt everywhere" and must inform any political reading of the ending's move towards assimilation.
The novel's philosophical framework precludes the endorsement of any singular cosmopolitanism.30 Desmond cites John Locke in a succinct statement of the novel's underlying political and literary machinery that aims to prevent such dangerous parochi alism: "When fashion has once sanctioned what folly or craft began, cus tom makes it sacred, and it will be thought impu dence or madness to contradict or question it" (183). Smith reminds us that Desmond's Sedgewood circle might also follow this trajectory from "folly or craft" to "fashion" and then on to unquestioned "custom. " Since Montfleuri's inclusion depends, to some extent, on his assimilation of English virtue, Desmond's brand of cosmo politanism hinges prob lematically on the manufacturing of sameness despite the mixed nature of the marriage. Smith astutely perceives the problem and in vokes Locke's caution about custom formation to prevent the insularity of the Sedgewood circle from turning radical politics and cosmopolitan embodiment into a potentially dogmatic new "fashion. " Bethel continues to problematize this hasty idealism with his indefatigable circumspection: "I am determined my little Louisa shall see the world before she is settled in it; that she may learn to enjoy it with moderation, or resign it with dignity" (66). For Bethel, differences are preserved as differences; little Louisa should "see the world" in its diversity without becoming "settled in it" prematurely. Surely this is not Bethel's thinly veiled criticism of the conclusion's homogenizing marriages, but it still provides a striking counterpoint to the radical enthusiasm of the ostensible protagonists. In both cases, Smith articulates a measured conciliation that takes neither radical nor conservative politics as unerring dogma, imagining a series of conversations and conversions that slowly erode those dangerous prejudices of "Men misled. " Reading "The Emigrants" as a simple retraction of the radical politics of Desmond misses the striking continuities between the two works, both of which (1) Taken out of context, these lines certainly sound like a reactionary renunciation of the ostensibly naive radicalism of Desmond. If we recall the problem of Bethel, however, the politics of the poem read less like conservative backlash and more like that version of political agility and rational scepticism that is so well-articulated in the novel. This does not mean that both works simply rehearse the same political manoeuvres; rather, Smith uses the poem as an opportunity to amplify the role of the exile and to express more fully the importance of the political residues left over at the end of Desmond. The two works do not differ in type-radical novel versus conservative poem-but in degree: whereas Bethel's role serves a subsidiary function that complicates the claustrophobic boundaries of the closed Sedgewood circle, the poem is explicitly exile in charlot te smith's desmond about exile and residue. The French émigrés take the narrative focus away from the neat confines of England and Englishness, and a version of Bethel's quiet resistance reasserts itself in full voice, forcing England to deal with displaced exiles and Revolu tion ary baggage.
Since I began with a somewhat misleading catalogue of the poem's most sublimely plaintive lines, I offer a few more that more precisely-though decidedly less spectacularly-represent Smith's consistently sober political stance:
we for them [the French émigrés] Feel as our brethren; and that English hearts, Of just compassion ever own the sway, As truly as our element, the deep, Obeys the mild dominion of the Moon. Both passages meditate on the viability of English asylum for the displaced French. Instead of foregrounding the felicity of the assimilatory English circle and backgrounding the resistance of the exile, as she does in Desmond, Smith turns the narrative around and foregrounds the exiles as exiles yet still with the insistence upon "compassion" and the universality of human feeling, "our element" that naturally "obeys the mild dominion of the Moon. " This deft juggling of philosophical and political categories-the universal and the particular, identity and difference, conservative and radical, "Loyalty" and "Liberty"-vitiates so completely the incessant back-and-forth exchanges between figures like Burke and Paine that she successfully gives shape to both Vertovec and Cohen's flexible cosmopolitanism and Robbins's "generous and useful" rethinking of the concept. In Michael Wiley's reading of "The Emigrants, " Smith successfully imagines that kind of cosmopolitan geography, one that transforms that "exhausted nationstate model" into a naturalized landscape that can at once deny difference (England and France) and accept the geopolitical construction of it. 33 Smith carves out a significant role for political agency that goes beyond partisan squabbling, and that political agent, armed with this cosmopolitan agility, moves across both physical and ideological borders. "Managing cultural and political multiplicities, " then, means being wary of political fashion and preserving radical notions of liberty, equality, and fraternity as genuinely radical notions that do not constantly threaten to dissolve into new forms of coercive authority.
With this reading of "The Emigrants" in mind, Bethel's role in Desmond comes into sharper focus. Seeing his character as the doddering old fool who eventually loses his argument makes us complicit with the propagandistic discourse that Smith wants her readers to reject. The poem is not Smith's unequivocal renuncia tion of her earlier revolutionary fervour because that kind of brazen radicalism was never truly there in the first place. Smith condemns any kind of complacency, whether revolutionary, radical, reac tionary, or conservative. Although Smith's political sympathies clearly lie with Paine and Wollstonecraft, their arguments lie fallow because they lack the social force required of an effective call to action.34 Instead of firing her own acerbic remarks, Smith shrewdly rewrites Burke's career as Bethel's conversion narrative. This tempered and accommodative radicalism comes out much more explicitly in "The Emigrants" because the poem was written after some of the revolutionary dust had settled to reveal the ugly consequences of "lawless Anarchy. " "Freedom misapplied, and much abus' d" (1:99), she argues, has debased the revolutionary cause and "thinned the world" (1:382) of its eager idealists. None of this more extreme rhetoric erupts in Desmond because the novel does offer a superficially comic conclusion to its sentimental plot even though it is mixed with the paradoxically more subversive scepticism of Bethel's quietly competing narrative. In this way, Desmond follows the English Jacobin novel's well-documented proclivity for generic experimentation. Smith opens up the comic genre's comforting sense of closure to balance revolutionary optimism with rational scepticism, an intermediate position that amounts to more than exile in charlot te smith's desmond just equivocation or cautious hedging. 35 Rather, Smith offers a way to understand more clearly how a Kantian cosmopolitanism might work: theory checked by practice, and practice checked by theory in a carefully worked out ecology of "cosmopolitan right. " Through this generic and philosophical experimentation, Smith can finally accommodate the residues of the Revolution: the French clergy, Burke, and, of course, Bethel.
William Godwin and William Hazlitt, both occasional advocates of a more traditional Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, made their own attempts to accommodate Burke into their political narratives. In An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, Godwin generously says of Burke's Reflections that the "argument is stated, with great copiousness, and irresistible force of reasoning. "36 Hazlitt lavishes praise on Burke for his positive stance on the American Revolu tion, even provocatively suggesting that Burke might just come around again to the revolutionary cause.37 Rhetorical apprecia tion and idle optimism proved insufficient to contain conservative anxiety, and the legacy of Enlightenment cos mopolitanism is one of bitter reaction. 38 In his multivolume Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism (1798-99), for example, the Abbé Augustin Barruel blamed the Revolution-and its cosmopolitan pipe dreams of international co-operation and community-on a dangerous secret society of freemasons and philosophes. He attacks specifically the vagueness and treasonous nature of Kant's inter national vision: "Under pretence of this perpetual peace that is to be enjoyed by future generations, they exile in charlot te smith's desmond ambitions for expatriation were never realized, and she remained in "dear England" until her death in 1806. As with Bethel, Smith could never truly gain entrance into Desmond's cosmopolitan circle. Even so, most critics have focused on the youthful Geraldine as Smith's autobiographical stand-in because of some superficial correspondences: both were trapped in unhappy marriages, and both turned to poetry to channel those frustrations.42 In suggest ing that Desmond is less radical and more cosmopolitan, I highlight the autobiographical dimension of Smith's treatment of Bethel, which is a significant narrative reconfiguration that not only complicates the novel's revolutionary politics, but also provides a tentative answer to what Peter Melville has called the problem of "resistance to accommodation" in Romantic "scenes of hospitality. "43 In this version of Romantic cosmopolitanism, strangers meet either vio lent rejection (Coleridge's man from Porlock) or a ponderous ethical responsibility. Smith (via Bethel) offers the necessary coun ter point to the brash radicalism of youth ful revolution; rather than violence, she offers measured con ver sion, and rather than mere responsibility, she demands judicious integration. It is important to recall that Smith wrote Desmond when she was in her forties, the author much closer in age to Bethel than to Desmond or Geraldine, and Smith remains one of the few Romantic authors who challenge our association of advancing age with political apostasy. Rather than preserving that youthful radicalism through static iterations of revolutionary ideology, Smith carves out an evolving space for the aging radical as a true cosmopolite who is not just an open-minded frequent traveller but rather a prickly exception that continually interrogates the radical rule. Through Bethel, Smith presents one of the most cogent calls for a more refined radicalism, a more responsible cosmopolitanism, and perhaps even a more grownup Romanticism.
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